Construction of meaning
The term ‘children on the move’ is not a new one. Its meaning, however, has changed over decades, and only in recent years has it become wholly associated with migrant children of all categories. Early usage of the term ‘children on the move’ comes across as more of a rhetorical attempt at presenting elegant niceties rather than one aimed at defining and establishing a specific term. Dottridge claims that the term began to be used around 2005 ‘to refer generically to children who had left their habitual place of residence to move either within their own country or to another country’ (Dottridge 2012, p. 21). From then on, definitions started to emerge from different organisations, all of them focussing on child migration. By 2008, Save the Children had already begun using ‘children on the move’ as a term widely referring to migrant children (Reale 2008). As with most other sectors, however, defining terms in this field is not an easy task. Echoing the reflections made earlier in this research about the malleability of the concept of childhood, Delaney concedes that the field is dominated by specialist words and concepts that ‘can mean different things in different places (within countries or even within organisations) or their meaning is not always clear’ (Delaney 2012, p. 4).
In 2010, several international intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations met for the International Conference on Protecting and Supporting Children on the Move, organised by the Global Movement for Children in BarcelonaFootnote 5. This resulted in a specific working group on COTM and a subsequent publication by the International Organisation for Migration. The latter envisioned the idea of COTM to be ‘a broad concept, encompassing children from diverse backgrounds and with different experiences’ (Crépeau and Dottridge 2013, p. 7).
Several definitions of “children on the move” were developed, both within and outside the DU, yet the NGO under study here, Terre des Hommes, adopted its own definition in 2012 (Dottridge 2012, p. 22) referring to:
Those children who have left their place of habitual residence and are either on the way towards a new destination, or have already reached such a destination. A child [on the move] can move across State borders, or within the country. S/he can be on the move alone, or in a group with family members, other adults and/or children, known or unknown previously to the child. Moreover, a distinction can be made among the various children on the move, based on the reasons behind such movement. The four categories concerned are:
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Internally displaced persons
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Asylum seekers and refugees
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Migrants (i.e., for economic reasons or due to climate change, both internally and across borders)
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Trafficked persons
It is therefore evident that in the space of a few years, the term COTM became quite well-established in humanitarian discourse. It was mainly developed by NGOs out of a need to capture a wide array of categories of children under one umbrella definition, but it was also quickly adopted in the discourse of international intergovernmental organisations. In the DU, this definition includes ‘categories such as the migrant children, trafficked children, street children, stateless children, refugee children, and internally displaced children’ (Ensuring Protection for Children On The Move 2010).
The efforts to categorise COTM while placing them under one conceptual heading bears striking parallelisms with the totalising and individualising features of productive power. Productive power is characteristically totalising because it pervades all aspects of life and draws everything to an acceptable norm, while also being individualising in the sense that it defines individuals in relation to that norm. COTM as an umbrella term for categorised children is therefore totalising because it greatly expands the productive power of the sector beyond exploitation and human trafficking, yet it is also individualising since it calcifies the segmentation of children into predetermined categories and bases their right to be protected solely on their individual best interests, ‘independently of their migration status, gender, age, health, nationality, religious or cultural belongings or any other ground’ (Terre des Hommes International Federation 2012).
Thus, by introducing an umbrella term in the form of “children on the move”, the discipline of protecting children embraced a large number of previously unconnected categories under one concept. All of these efforts to define and research COTM resulted in shaping reality in such a way as to create new problems and opportunities for intervention. In fact, the texts that were analysed in this research which were part of the DU carry on with their definition of COTM to identify what the issues to tackle are and in which areas the organisations can intervene. They also actively prioritise problems and, for instance, ask: ‘What risks attached to moving should be a priority to tackle?’ (Dottridge 2012, p. 56).
The authors of such texts deliberately ask where the main problems are and where and in what way the campaign may potentially intervene. These texts point towards opportunities to protect and opportunities for protection. This, however, raises another important question in the light of paternalism in humanitarianism: an opportunity for whom? Is this an opportunity for children to seek protection or for other actors to intervene and protect children? While there is a fine line between the two, the available texts seem to increasingly point to the latter case. This view is emphasised by the fact that a child protection agency is defined in the DU handbook as ‘any organization that has the mandate to protect children’ (Delaney 2012, p. 5, emphasis added).
The texts analysed for the purpose of this research all draw strength and legitimacy from international law and conventions. In this sense, the campaign uses the universal notion of childhood present at an international level and presents it as the “real” interest as opposed to other “perceived” interests the actors involved might have. It is here that a pertinent degree of paternalism is also revealed when the issue is analysed through the framework of productive power, where interests (real or perceived) are forged rather than predetermined. By drawing on international law, literature on COTM unwittingly imposes an “ideal” that may not be consistent with local perceptions and might be seen as being colonialist in nature.
The power of authority
A question here has to be asked: by what authority does the DU impose a specific idea of “childhood”? Humanitarians wield moral authority derived from a supposed sense of disinterested care and the authority, to speak on behalf of the victims. They consider themselves as able representatives of distant strangers because they were witnesses of suffering who have recorded the pain of the victims and can ‘speak with the authority of the eyewitness’ (Barnett 2010, p. 112). From the cases of moral authority derived from experience present in the texts analysed within the DU, one instance stands out for its clear reference to witness authority:
While the governments of industrialised countries appear convinced that the best response to unwanted migrant children is to send them back to where they came from, NGOs which have substantial experience of caring for such children, both as migrants in Europe and after they arrive back in their countries of origin, have very different views. (Dottridge 2008, p. 42)
By evoking the involvement of NGOs with migrant children, Dottridge highlights their moral authority and contrasts it to the views of governments. Thus, “being there” allows NGOs to speak on the children’s behalf, and this authority to represent the suffering stranger gives humanitarians the subtle, productive power to influence politics, while at the same time staying out of its confines.
Similarly, expert authority is another type of authority that bears traces of productive power. The literature on COTM is characterised by appeals for more research and information to be published. Cazenave, for instance, laments the fact that the phenomenon where ‘the protection of children in an area where the freedom to movement is a right but where a cross-border element hampers protection processes’ is one that ‘has received too little attention to date’ (Cazenave 2012, p. 5); the research by Terre des Hommes is aimed at tackling this problem.
The right of organisations such as TDHIF to conduct and publish research on COTM is based on their expert authority. Like moral authority, expert authority is derived both from the experience of such organisations, and their presence on the ground. This can be noticed in excerpts such as one from (Re)Building the Future that is described by Delaney as a handbook that was developed out of literature, workshops, and consultant expertise. Research contributes to an ever-growing body of “expert” knowledge on COTM. This knowledge is generated by research units in NGOs, as well as in conferences (such as the International Conference on Protecting and Supporting Children on the Move) and working groups (such as the Inter-Agency Working Group on Children on the Move) (Crépeau and Dottridge 2013, p. 7).
Within the conceptual framework of productive power, a body of knowledge is a blueprint for the formation of subjects. A system of knowledge consists of a set of beliefs that are considered as “true”—a truth to live up to (Digeser 1992, p. 987). The establishment of a new concept of COTM, as well as the research supporting it, creates a system of knowledge that is therefore also a mechanism of power. The other side of the coin is that this generation of knowledge is also infused with productive power. This power both sustains and is sustained by the expert authority it generates.
Generating research, however, is not just an exercise to produce knowledge on COTM but it also allows for that knowledge to be used as a tool when doing advocacy work. This is one of the key objectives of the DU which aims to bring COTM to the attention of supranational (Parata 2014), regional and national institutions (AMWCY et al. n.d.). This is a way to combat ‘evidence that the governments of numerous countries around the world—both developing and industrialized ones—act as if COTM were invisible’ (Crépeau and Dottridge 2013, p. 8) and to campaign so as to put COTM on the political agenda by solidifying the relationship between knowledge and power. During his interview, Salvatore Parata emphasised the fact that one of the main reasons for the DU to conduct research is to generate expertise for the campaign. This research is seen as a key tool for raising awareness among legislators and decision-makers and engaging in advocacy that is backed with the necessary expertise.
Literature on COTM, and the DU in particular, also emphasises the need to gather as much data as possible on COTM so as to be able to act knowledgeably. States are therefore encouraged to ‘strengthen their data-collecting and -analysing capacity regarding migrant children in all phases of the migratory process, in order to formulate and implement child-sensitive migration policies’ (Ibid., p. 2).
Furthermore, most texts indicate that the best agents to gather information are the children themselves. Here, one can observe a key effect of productive power in the generation of knowledge since, by transforming children into agents who act upon the principles of the rights of COTM, this body of knowledge is forging children into new subjects. The children’s interests (real or perceived) are not trampled but forged through productive power. In this way, acting on the knowledge on COTM inevitably promotes the interests of the child, which were given birth by the same productive power.
Subjects, however, are produced not only from children but also from the aid workers themselves. Part of the publications in the DU is aimed at training workers in the field of child protection to enable them to act on the needs of COTM. Many of the texts analysed within the case study of the campaign, in fact, had this purpose in mind. The two key publications in this regard were those by Dottridge and Delaney. Delaney clearly states this by declaring that the ‘primary purpose of this handbook is to expand on project workers’ understanding of how to help trafficked children’ (Delaney 2012, p. 7). This authority to provide training and publish handbooks on COTM (and thereby develop a body of knowledge that is used in turn to produce subjects) seems to be derived from experience and expertise. The handbook What can you do to protect Children on the Move? gives an overview of how it was developed and brings to attention the expertise of the consultant, the experience of the people participating in the workshops, as well as the difficulty to clearly define children on the move (Dottridge 2012, p. 13).
One of the most important features of productive power is the semblance of scientific objectivity that is given to knowledge. Knowledge that is scientific is rarely disputed since it claims to be apolitical and objective (Digeser 1992). The discourse on COTM aspires to this position. Two passages stand out from the publications under study:
There is much debate about the use of the word “victim” to describe children who may have been trafficked; many people think this label can trap children in a situation of powerlessness. Thus, the term survivor is preferred by many people working with children. However, both terms are problematic because they define and make judgements about children. In this handbook, we use the terms trafficked children, children who have been trafficked or former trafficked children because they are purely descriptive or what has happened to children. Delaney 2012, p. 6, emphasis added)
Furthermore, it [the notion of mobility] is a neutral term, without positive or negative connotations. It can then be used in an objective manner, without introducing at the outset ideological or normative connotations that might distort the look and the analysis. (AMWCY et al. n.d., p. 10–11, emphasis added)
This form of productive power is totalising because it draws on scientific objectivity to normalise subjects through constant measurement and observation. Expert authority, however, is the foundation for techniques of measurement and observation (see Panopticism in Foucault 1977). This relies on a universal (and scientifically objective) concept for COTM and ways to gather information on them. Moreover, the texts analysed call for the techniques of surveillance to be legally, and geographically, expanded through systems of protection. It is important to note that the second extract quoted above comes from a child-run organisation of working children (commonly referred as NATs—Niños y Adolescentes Trabajadores). Cordero Arce makes the compelling argument that these organisations are an example of how an emancipatory discourse of children’s rights can emerge, yet he fails to convincingly show how this discourse could be institutionalised and indeed reveals several mechanisms through which the human rights regime actively resists it (Cordero Arce 2012). Crucially, this shows how an organisation such as the AMWCY has been integrated into, and (re)formed in accordance to, the ideas of the DU.
The literature on the disappearance of children from institutions in Europe is interesting to look at with regard to systems of protection. The publication on the surfeit of children in Europe mainly focuses on the problem represented by the fact that
the principle of actively searching for a minor who has disappeared from an institution is very rarely implemented, in contrast to the immediate search which is initiated when a national child disappears. (Terre des Hommes 2009, p. 11)
An escape of a child from the radar of state institutions, even of its own free will, is deemed to be unacceptable. The report conveys the message that, in the best interest of the child, it needs to be under the protection of the state, and that the latter should do everything in its power to ensure that the minor is always under surveillance.
Thus, expert authority is always at the centre of the discourse on COTM. Expert authority is multi-faceted and is a key reflection of productive power: its use in advocacy work can be explained through the special relationship between knowledge and power; its enabling, through the use of children, the gathering of information and the training of workers, thus forges docile subjects; and the necessity to spread its use legally and spatially is a panoptical exercise in the name of the best interest of the child.
Paternalism-imposition in the name of best interests?
One of the main ways for human rights organisations to deflect accusations of paternalism is to point out the right to participationFootnote 6. The will to make participation happen seems true and sincere. Yet there still seems to be an acknowledged gap ‘between the views expressed and the decisions the NGO [makes] that [affect] the child’ and that ‘on the whole it remains true that [the children] are either given no opportunity to express their views or, if they are, their views are ignored’ (Dottridge 2012, p. 62). To protect COTM, there also needs to be a person who facilitates the process and knows where it is headed. In fact, demand 9 suggests that although NGO’s and other actors are obliged to listen to children, they still have the role of ‘designing and implementing projects for them’ (Terre des Hommes International Federation 2012, p. 3).
The impression that the concept of participation is only paid lip-service is augmented by the incessant reminders in the texts that, ‘while the participation of children is important, it is critical to recognize that the responsibility of protecting children remains with adults’ (Delaney 2012, p. 30) and that ‘we must always be clear that adults are responsible for protecting children’ (Ibid., p. 24). This is another aspect of the rights of COTM that suggests, and indeed, justifies paternalism. COTM are treated first and foremost ‘according to child protection legal standards and not exclusively according to an illegal immigration perspective’ (Terre des Hommes 2009, p. 12). They are therefore ‘treated as children first’ (Crépeau and Dottridge 2013, p. 7). Moreover, the nature of the “child” is typically represented as that of a vulnerable being in need of protection. This Western perspective of the child is based on the UNCRC in that, while it
recognizes, on the one hand, that children are holders of rights and capable actors in their own respect, it also sees childhood as a phase in which the girl or boy is still evolving physically, mentally and emotionally, thus requiring special measures to protect and promote their development (Lansdown, 2005). (Thatun and Heissler in Crépeau and Dottridge 2013, p. 99)
The difference between this view of childhood and the notion of participation is surprisingly evident. Delaney mentions that one should be careful not to mistake “pseudo-maturity” in children with actual maturity, explaining that pseudo-maturity is
appearing to be more mature than is developmentally appropriate […] resulting when children learn that they need to take care or themselves and when adults are not considered a source of support and protection. (Delaney 2012: 9)
Perpetuating a universal idea of childhood should be seen as being inherently problematic, especially since it adds another layer of paternalism to the more obvious adult-child dynamic, this time in the form of cultural colonialism. Crépeau and Dottridge (2013, p. 4) state that ‘we should always devise a treatment for migrant children that we would consider appropriate for ‘our’ own children’, in a context where “our” refers to us as NGOs with universal (or Western) principles. This may be translated into a form of paternalism based on expert authority that is drawn from a specific system of knowledge on COTM that creates two subjects: the developed adult and the developing COTM.
The most important bulwark for the interference of humanitarians in the life of the COTM is the idea that doing so is in their best interests. The “best interests of the child” (enshrined in Article 3 of the UNCRC) is defined as ‘the concept of ensuring that what actions take place or what plans are made places the most importance on the needs of a child and their welfare’ (Delaney 2012, p. 4). Identifying the ‘needs’ in this case is an exercise that relies on moral and expert authority and also on the ability to gather information from the participating child. Participation thus becomes a tool to construct the child’s best interests according to international norms and justify acting upon them. It is important, for instance, to find out ‘about children’s experiences and to make decisions with them and on their behalf, which explicitly make the best interests of the child concerned a primary consideration in the decision’ (Crépeau and Dottridge 2013, p. 9, emphasis added).
Workers are obliged ‘to make the best interests of the child a primary consideration in all actions that concern either an individual child or a group of children’ (Dottridge 2012, p. 44) and observe that ‘other primary considerations (such as a Government’s policies on immigration) may not be given more importance that (sic) a child’s best interests in decisions and actions affecting that child’ (Ibid., p. 5). Thus, principles based on international norms trump local views yet again.