Table 2 The example of path dependency in the famine response

The declaration of famine in South Sudan is a good example for studying the extent to which humanitarian action is agile and mobile or locked in a path-dependency cycle.

After famine was declared in two counties of South Sudan in February 2017, many international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and United Nations agencies encountered a strong call (albeit contested) to prioritise the needs of people affected by the famine over the needs of those affected by the conflict and considering the difficulties of acting in a high-intensity conflict setting. There was also a call for organisations to try to change their focus of action, counteracting the trend to keep working in places where programmes have already been implemented. However, despite these organisations’ drive to respond and the new resources, incentives and objectives that the famine drew to South Sudan, many INGOs were unable to respond to the ‘new’ crisis, access was increasingly hindered (OCHA 2017b) and the dominant strategy was to prioritise the response based on available resources (OCHA 2017a).

The main reason for this given in the interviews in this study pointed to a lack of flexibility in terms of funds and changing project and programme objectives. As one INGO manager stated, ‘We cannot just re-direct funds to cover the famine response’. Similarly, aid actors mentioned that responding to the famine meant working with ‘new people, new plans, new everything’ and noted that it is challenging to move people and funding from one project to another. It was also mentioned that responding to the famine meant giving less priority to existing projects or altering their implementation. An INGO staff member noted that ‘Emergency programmes are short term, no more than one year: any detraction and you will not be on time’. Relatedly, even with the additional funds available, acting on the famine would require modifying existing projects and reaching new agreements with donors because the organisations did not have the capacity to work on multiple complex emergencies simultaneously. In interviews with donors, they said that they would allow more time or some level of flexibility to respond to the famine; however, only a few INGOs contacted their donors to discuss this possibility.

Recent research with a panel of South Sudanese scholars and academics (see Deng 2018) also pointed out to the reduced access of information of the situation in parts of the country as an explanation for lack of actions in famine-affected areas. This panel mentioned the importance to consider the extremely low number of South Sudanese aid actor at senior management positions, which resulted in reduced access to or proper interpretation of local-level information.

A final explanation presented for the limited capacity to respond to the famine is that the declaration of famine can be seen more as a political move aiming to unleash a set of humanitarian actions than as a real famine situation. All participants were careful to clarify that this statement should not be taken to diminish the severity of the situation or the level of malnutrition experienced; however, it should be made clear that for them, a famine defined as two of every 10,000 people dying each day and over than 30% of the population suffering acute malnutrition (FEWS 2016), is not precisely what was happening, even in the worst-affected areas of South Sudan. Therefore, although some level of response is urgently needed, the situation is not as urgent as it appears.

In summary, from a triage point of view, when deciding to respond to the famine, only a few organisations were able to organise effective responses in a short period of time and were independent enough to implement in this high-intensity conflict setting.